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Interorganizational Linkages in Sport Industry Clusters – Types, Development, and Motives 
ABSTRACT 
 
This article addresses three main questions: what kind of interorganizational linkages exist in 
sport industry clusters, how do they develop over time, and what are the motivations for creating 
or joining them. Different types of interorganizational linkages are identified according to the 
number of partners involved, the formalized nature of linkages, and the type of organizations 
involved. A multiple case study approach is adopted. The empirical context are two sport 
industry clusters in sailing (France and New Zealand). Results show that interorganizational 
relationships tend to be formalized, while interorganizational networks tend to be informal. A 
circular development process of different types of linkages was detected. Reciprocity is the most 
prevalent motive for the development of all types of linkages.  
Keywords: interorganizational, cluster, cross-sectoral 
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Interorganizational Linkages in Sport Industry Clusters –  
Types, Development, and Motives 
Abstract 
This article addresses three main questions: what kind of interorganizational linkages exist in 
sport industry clusters, how do they develop over time, and what are the motivations for 
creating or joining them. Different types of interorganizational linkages are identified 
according to the number of partners involved, the formalized nature of linkages, and the type 
of organizations involved. A multiple case study approach is adopted. The empirical context 
are two sport industry clusters in sailing (France and New Zealand). Results show that 
interorganizational relationships tend to be formalized, while interorganizational networks 
tend to be informal. A circular development process of different types of linkages was 
detected. Reciprocity is the most prevalent motive for the development of all types of 
linkages.  
Introduction 
Sport systems and their actors are complex and often vary in form, structure, and purpose 
across different countries. The actors of sport systems typically include interest groups that 
are organized commercially (e.g., sports equipment firm), institutionalized non-profit 
organizations (e.g., amateur sports club), governing bodies (e.g., the Ministry of Sports), or 
unorganized stakeholders (e.g., customers of a sports brand) (Petry, Steinbach, & Tokarski, 
2004; Shilbury, 2000). Previous research on sport systems has focused on policy issues in 
elite and professional sports (De Bosscher, De Knop, van Bottenburg, Shibli, & Bingham, 
2009; Dickson, Arnold, & Chalip, 2005; Dickson, Phelps, & Waugh, 2009), governance 
aspects in amateur and volunteer administered sport organizations (Ferkins, Shilbury, & 
McDonald, 2005; Inglis, 1997), or the transition of the latter in professionally run sport 
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organizations (Macris & Sam, 2014). This article contributes to interorganizational literature 
in sport management by examining relational activities and including a range of stakeholder 
groups to uncover the complexity of interaction (Wolfe et al., 2005).  
Thus, this article investigates interorganizational linkages between a variety of 
stakeholders in sport industry clusters and discusses motives for creating or joining these 
linkages. While organizational studies in the context of sport (Wolfe et al., 2005) and changes 
in sport organizations (Ciomaga, 2013) have been identified as a major research theme, sport 
management research has focused on organizational level research investigating primarily 
sport governing bodies, clubs, and leagues. Interorganizational relationships (IORs) and 
collaborative arrangements have been studied in cross sector sport settings with non-profit 
organizations as focal actors (Babiak, 2007; Babiak & Thibault, 2009). However, the profit 
sport sector has mainly been studied from a consumer perspective, e.g., branding (Chanavat, 
Martinent, & Ferrand, 2009), or a macro perspective, e.g., international trade in sports goods 
(Andreff, 2006) rather than from an interorganizational perspective (Ciomaga, 2013; Warren 
& Gibson, 2013).  
The management of interorganizational linkages between sport organizations from 
various stakeholder groups including profit, governmental, and non-profit sectors has become 
increasingly important due to the heterogeneity of sport systems. Extant research in this area 
has examined the motives for IORs in cross sector relationships in elite sport (e.g., access to 
resources, legitimacy seeking, reciprocity and strategic positioning among others) as well as 
the challenge of balancing competition and collaboration (Babiak, 2007; Babiak & Thibault, 
2009). Other research focused on IORs and key management practices in professional sport 
(Cousens, Babiak, & Slack, 2000), across municipal recreation organizations (Frisby, 
Thibault, & Kikulis, 2004), or in the context of sport organizations and corporate sponsors 
(Cousens, Babiak, & Bradish, 2006). 
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This article addresses three main questions: what kind of interorganizational linkages 
exist in sport industry clusters, how do they develop over time, and what are the motivations 
for creating or joining them. A main objective was to examine not only dyadic relationships 
but also interorganizational networks (IONs). The diverse stakeholders in sport industry 
clusters include private companies providing different sport equipment (core equipment 
manufacturers, systems suppliers, or accessory suppliers), services, media, or designs, 
professional and amateur sport entities, governing bodies, and education/research institutes 
related to a particular sport. The geographical proximity of cluster member organizations, 
historical and socio-cultural anchorage, as well as strong interpersonal and interorganizational 
ties through sport related but also economic activities create an interesting empirical field to 
investigate interorganizational linkages.  
The remainder of the article is structured as follows. The theoretical background is 
outlined developing deductively the theoretical framework for this research. The next section 
sets out research methods, the empirical context, and the data collection and analysis process. 
Findings are presented according to the different research questions and topics. The 
discussion reflects those findings on existent literature and conclusions highlight future 
research directions resulting from this research. 
Theoretical Background 
Interorganizational Relationships and Networks 
IORs are bilateral linkages between two organizations – cluster members in our case – that are 
established through regular interactions or transactions with the common aim of serving 
mutual beneficial purposes in a certain area (Babiak, 2007; Oliver, 1990). IONs are defined as 
multilateral linkages that consist of at least three organizations – here cluster members – that 
are connected in ways that facilitate the achievement of a common goal (Gerke, 2014; Provan, 
Fish, & Sydow, 2007). IONs are created when an IOR is affected by organizations of the 
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environment in which they are embedded (Warren, 1967). The formalized nature of linkages 
was distinguished in those that had a legal or formal status, and hence a definite structure or 
shape, and those that are lose, friendly, unofficial and hence of informal nature (Babiak, 2007; 
Gerke, 2014). Formal linkages are fixed in a form of contract, rules, or procedures that were 
agreed upon not just with words, while informal linkages do not result in documented 
evidence (Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). 
Previous research on interorganizational linkages has examined companies’ linkages 
to stakeholders including customers, suppliers, competitors, and public authorities (Gadde, 
Huemer, & Hakansson, 2003; Håkansson, 2006). IOR and ION studies have investigated 
strategic alliances, partnerships, coalitions, joint ventures, franchises, research consortia, 
network organizations, trade associations, agency federations, social service joint programs, 
corporate-financial interlocks, and agency-sponsor linkages (Oliver, 1990; Ring & Van De 
Ven, 1994). The geographical concentration of interconnected companies and associated 
institutions in one field – usually denominated as industrial districts (Marshall, 1920) or 
clusters (Porter, 2008) – is a rich empirical context to study IORs and IONs (Bell, Tracey, & 
Heide, 2009; Capo-Vicedo, Exposito-Langa, & Molina-Morales, 2008; Connell & Voola, 
2013; Gomes & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013; Li, Veliyath, & Tan, 2013; Mendez & 
Mercier, 2006). Some articles focused on interorganizational linkages in sport-based industry 
clusters (Chetty & Agndal, 2008; Gerke, 2014; Stewart, Skinner, & Edwards, 2008). 
Traditionally interorganizational linkages and interactions between companies have 
been determined by market mechanisms (Håkansson, 2006, Johanson & Vahlne, 2011). The 
organizational environment and the companies’ connections to their environment have 
become more complex mainly through globalization, new industry structures, and advanced 
information technologies. Interorganizational linkages and behaviors change from simple 
bilateral market exchanges towards networks of ‘thick’ linkages – going beyond simple price 
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mechanisms. Interorganizational linkages develop to more complex interactions and 
behavioral patterns that determine the interplay of an organization with its environment. This 
was found in various different industries including high-tech areas but also production-
oriented industries (Gadde et al., 2003; Håkansson, 2006; Johanson & Mattson, 1988; Porter, 
2008). Various reasons have been suggested to explain this development including the need 
for better quality control and higher efficiency across the value chain, better customer 
relationship management, new ways to innovate, and the internationalization of firms through 
smaller independent units (Gadde et al., 2003; Håkansson, 2006).  
IORs and IONs are a means for product and production process development through 
new combinations of resources belonging to different organisations (Capo-Vicedo et al., 
2008; Gerke, 2014; Håkansson, 2006). A joint development approach towards a product or 
process allows the consideration of the needs and ideas of all the organizations involved in the 
value chain. Success factors are stable, trustful, and lasting interorganizational linkages that 
give access to broader knowledge and that provide a better understanding of the partner 
organizations’ needs and capabilities. Linkages that aim at joint development consist of 
technical, social, and economic interdependencies. These are reinforced through firm 
specialization. While economic interdependencies tend to be exogenous – caused by external 
factors – social elements tend to be endogenous – hence resulting from within established 
business linkages. Technical interdependencies can be both, inherent in some kind of 
technology or created through the joint development of new technology (Håkansson, 2006).  
Relational strategy stresses the ability to create and maintain IOR in order to sustain in 
a market (Gadde et al., 2003; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Inherent elements of successful clusters 
are relational interaction patterns (Molina-Morales et al., 2015). Previous research highlights 
deliberate interorganizational efforts among co-located firms towards relational governance. 
The effect of knowledge sharing and knowledge spillovers resulting from a collective pool of 
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spatially confined knowledge uniquely available to cluster members is one of the main 
benefits of relational governance (Bell et al., 2009; Capo-Vicedo et al., 2008; Connell & 
Voola, 2013). Social relations are crucial element towards relational governance because they 
facilitate interaction and collaboration. Key characteristics of innovative clusters with 
relational governance are decentralization, high level of cooperation, dense social networks, 
and high levels of social capital (Bell et al., 2009). The underlying prerequisite of relational 
governance in a cluster is a macro culture which reflects the values, norms, and objectives 
shared by the cluster members (Bell et al., 2009; Gomes & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013). 
The role of interorganizational linkages and social capital for cluster governance 
depends on the type of cluster. A cluster can be dominated and governed by a larger number 
of mainly locally owned small- and medium-sized enterprises (SME); based around a small 
number of larger vertically integrated firms and their local suppliers; state-anchored based 
around a public or non-profit organization; or it can be a satellite cluster that comprises local 
branches of different multinational enterprises that are headquartered outside of the cluster 
(Bell et al., 2009). Interorganizational linkages are crucial especially for the first type of 
cluster consisting mainly of SMEs. Their limits in size and resources makes them depend on 
cooperation with other firms to solve problems (Connell & Voola, 2013). Sport industry 
clusters tend to take the form of SME dominated clusters (Chetty & Agndal, 2008; Gerke, 
2014; Stewart et al., 2008; Warren & Gibson, 2013). 
Formal versus Informal Linkages 
The role of formalization of interorganizational linkages in clusters is controversial (Dana & 
Granata, 2013; Vlaar et al., 2006). Some authors argue that the formalization of 
interorganizational linkages reduces problems of understanding, especially in early stages of 
interorganizational linkages (Vlaar et al., 2006). IORs are characterized by levels of 
ambiguity and uncertainty due to different structures, cultures, functional capabilities, 
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cognitive frames, terminologies, management styles, and philosophies. This is especially the 
case when the latter are from separate backgrounds, different industries, and dissimilar belief 
systems (Vlaar et al., 2006). Dana and Granata (2013) argue that formalization of actions in a 
cluster strengthens collaborations and creates a collaborative spirit. In contrast, Gomes and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen (2013) argue that informal relations strengthen the unification of the 
cluster. Informal links are facilitated in clusters through geographical proximity allowing for 
frequent, repeated, unofficial, informal contacts and exchange that facilitate the creation of 
strong interorganizational ties (Capo-Vicedo et al., 2008).  
The definition of formal linkages is ambiguous with regards to processes versus 
outcomes. Interorganizational processes can be formalized through planning, projecting, 
codifying, and enforcing of exchanges. The outcomes of this formalization process are 
contracts, rules, procedures, and plans (Vlaar et al., 2006). Gadde et al. (2003) argue for 
informal agreements and trust as alterative governance forms of interorganizational linkages. 
Formalization of linkages might cause locked-in effects and refrain organizations from joining 
collective initiatives (Gadde et al., 2003). Furthermore processes and outcomes as different 
phases of interorganizational linkages can have different formalized natures (e.g., the outcome 
is a contract but the negotiation process happens during informal exchanges).  
The formalization of interorganizational linkages in the sport context is also debatable. 
Institutional changes in sport systems (e.g., shift of governmental funding for sports) have 
caused tendencies to the creation and formalization of interorganizational linkages. A lack of 
knowledge of how to formalize IORs has been attested as issue for non-profit organizations to 
engage in IORs (Babiak, 2007). However, organizations in sport clusters tend to have similar 
beliefs and modes of functioning, and hence do not insist on the formalization of 
interorganizational linkages (Allen, Drane, Byon, & Mohn, 2010, Gerke, 2014). The 
aforementioned motivations for formalizing interorganizational linkages to reduce problems 
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of understanding (e.g., different structures, cultures, functional capabilities, cognitive frames, 
terminologies) may not be valid in the case of sport industry clusters. Hence, we explore the 
role of formalization of interorganizational linkages in sport industry clusters. 
Development and Motives for Interorganizational Linkages  
Different motives for the development of IORs and IONs have been identified. Chetty and 
Agndal (2008) argue that IONs develop on the basis of interpersonal networks. Ring and Van 
De Ven (1994) identify key success factors to explain IOR development and longevity: 
congruent sense making and psychological contracts amongst partnering organizations; 
continuance of assigned individuals in IOR; informal psychological contracts substituting 
formal contracts with increased trust and reliance; formalization of IOR when temporal 
duration of IORs are expected to exceed tenure of involved agents; decreasing risk for rupture 
as duration of IOR increases; and increased risk of rupture if repeated imbalances occur in 
IORs.  
Particular motives for the creation or for joining interorganizational linkages in 
industrial clusters are identified: performance enhancement (Gadde et al., 2003), risk 
reduction (Johanson & Mattson, 1988), and creation and diffusion of knowledge (Capo-
Vicedo et al., 2008). Babiak (2007) investigated multiple motives for IOR formation amongst 
collaborating cross-sector organizations and found complex and interrelated drivers for 
partnership formation. Oliver (1990) proposed an analytical framework of six motivational 
patterns that determine organizations’ decisions to engage in IOR. Those factors are 
asymmetry, reciprocity, necessity, legitimacy, efficiency, and stability. In this study, we use 
Oliver’s (1990) analytical framing as a foundation to specify motives for IOR/ION 
development in sport industry clusters. 
Specifically, each of these motives reflect individual and collective intentions to 
engage in IORs. We describe them below and distill each of the motives’ key elements. 
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Asymmetry refers to the desire or potential to exercise power or control over another 
organization and its resources (Babiak, 2007; Oliver, 1990). Asymmetry as motive reflects a 
power dominated approach to explaining IOR/ION formation. An organization with 
asymmetry as motive for IOR/ION considers its environment as unjust, unequal, manipulated, 
and full of information distortion, exploitation, coercion, and conflict (Oliver, 1990). 
Therefore the only way to interact with the environment is via power, control, and 
domination. In the context of clusters this means that member organizations can potentially 
exercise power or control over others.  
Reciprocity as motive for informal IONs or IORs reflects the pursuit of collaborative 
advantage (Huxham & Vangen, 2009). It is the opposite contingency for IOR formation 
regarding asymmetry and postulates that organizations in alliances, partnerships, or networks 
work more effectively and efficiently than counterparts elsewhere that act isolated (Babiak, 
2007; Porter, 2008). An organization that has reciprocity as a motive to join an IOR/ION aims 
at cooperation, collaboration, and coordination. Theory of collaborative advantage and 
relational strategy explains how common aims can be achieved more effectively with joints 
efforts and shared resources rather than alone (Huxham & Vangen, 2009; Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Collective behavior theory confirms that members of a collective group are linked in 
two ways: commensalistically and symbiotically (Astley & Fombrun, 1983). Commensalistic 
interdependence refers to whether members are directly linked through collaboration or 
indirectly through competition for scarce resources. Symbiotic interdependence means 
whether members of a collective group are bilaterally related (IOR) or through multilateral 
networks (ION) (Astley & Fombrun, 1983).  
The motives asymmetry and reciprocity occur simultaneously when two organizations 
collaborate to exert power and control over a third organization. Organizations’ initial 
motivations for an IOR might change over time and depend on the other organizations’ 
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behavior (Oliver, 1990). Asymmetry and reciprocity refer to the type of interorganizational 
linkage depending on the number of organizations involved (IOR versus ION) and the type of 
interaction (collaboration versus competition). Collaboration and competition are typically 
associated with clusters and behavior amongst cluster members. Therefore these two 
contingencies are assumed to be most pertinent in the analysis of motivational patterns of 
cluster members to join IORs and IONs in sport industry clusters. Four remaining 
contingencies complete Oliver’s (1990) framework. 
Necessity. The necessity contingency refers to motives to join IORs in order to meet 
necessary legal or regulatory requirements. An example for necessity as a motive is the 
formation of IORs of a national sport center with its founding partners which depends on 
those for continued financial support (Babiak, 2007).  
Efficiency. An organization’s efficiency motive to engage in IORs, refers to the 
organization’s attempts to improve its internal input/output ratio through collaborative 
activity. The efficiency motive might be driven by desires to increase buying power, 
consolidate, and maximize the use of resources, and achieve economies of scale (Babiak, 
2007; Oliver, 1990).  
Stability. The stability motive refers to organizations’ attempts to adapt to 
environmental changes and uncertainty through engaging in IORs. This leads not only to 
predictability but also to dependability. Uncertainty of funding and the increased number of 
organizations providing the same or similar services encourage sport organizations to create 
long-term IORs to assure funding sources and regular customers/members (Babiak, 2007). In 
business-to-business IORs (e.g., joint ventures, trade associations) stability motives are 
related to factors like finding joint solutions for legislative or environmental product norms 
and standards or sharing entry risk into new markets (Johanson & Mattson, 1988; Oliver, 
1990).  
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Legitimacy. The final motive for organizations to engage in IORs is to enhance 
organizational legitimacy towards it environment (Oliver, 1990). Organizations are exposed 
to external pressures – economic, social, or political – to which they need to respond to appear 
legitimate (Oliver, 1990). In the sport context it means that sport organizations engage in 
IOR/ION with non-traditional partners, e.g., cross-sector partnerships between public, private, 
and sport organizations. Private firms might seek to enter in IOR/ION with amateur sport 
organizations to appear more legitimate (Babiak, 2007). 
Figure 1 illustrates the research framework summarizing the three research questions. 
First, what kind of interorganizational linkages exist in sport industry clusters, second how do 
they develop over time and what are the motivational patterns for joining or creating 
interorganizational links in sport industry clusters. 
----- Insert Figure 1 here ---- 
Figure 1: Research framework 
Methods 
Case study research permits the creation of close links between science and reality, and a 
strong connection between theory, method, and data (Dubois & Araujo, 2007). The multiple 
case study method permits theory development through theoretical replication and enhances 
theories’ robustness through literal and theoretical replication (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). 
We chose two case studies that allow these theory-building techniques: one sailing cluster in 
France (SAILBRIT) and one in New Zealand (SAILAUCK). Theoretical replication is 
assured through cross-case analysis of clusters across different cultures and nations (France 
and New Zealand). Literal replication is assured through cross-case analysis of cases in the 
same sport (sailing).  
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Research Context 
The research context of this paper are industrial agglomerations in a particular geographical 
area whose members share an interest in the same or similar sports as profit, non-profit or 
public organization. Sport industry cluster were chosen because membership is very diverse 
and interconnectedness is high (Gerke, 2014; Gerke, Desbordes, & Dickson., 2015, Shilbury, 
2000).The two sport industry clusters studied for this research focus on sailing equipment and 
technology for ocean racing. Both clusters comprise a number of interconnected organizations 
that provide different products or services related to ocean racing, professional and amateur 
sport entities, sport-related education/research institutes, and governing bodies that exert 
control or influence over these organizations. A typology of ten different cluster organizations 
(CLOR) as members of the cluster was used. Each type of CLOR was classified as profit 
organization or non-profit organization. Profit organizations included core equipment 
manufacturers, systems suppliers, accessory suppliers, media/communications firms, 
service/consulting firms, and designers/architects. Non-profit organizations included 
governing bodies and education/research institutes. Amateur sport and professional sport 
entities were either profit or non-profit organizations (Gerke, 2014, Gerke et al., 2015). These 
CLORs provided the context to investigate interorganizational linkages in sport industry 
clusters (Figure 2). 
------------------ Insert Figure 2 here. ----------------- 
Figure 2. Types of organization in sport industry clusters (adapted from Gerke et al., 2015) 
Cases were chosen because they were expected to explain investigated phenomena 
best. A literature review on sport industry clusters showed that industries around outdoor 
sports tend to develop in clusters (Gerke, 2014, Gerke et al, 2015). Previous studies on sport 
industry clusters examined industries in outdoor sports including horse-riding (Parker & 
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Beedell, 2010), skateboarding (Kellett & Russell, 2009), surfing (Stewart et al., 2008; Warren 
& Gibson, 2013) and sailing (Chetty & Agndal, 2008; Sarvan et al., 2011). Locations with a 
high density of firms and related organizations in the same sport – sailing – were chosen as 
case studies.  
SAILBRIT – the sailing cluster in France is located in southern Brittany in the 
northwest of France stretching across approximately 185 km with Lorient in the center 
accommodating most of the CLORs. A mixed-funded – public and private sources – cluster 
governing body dedicated to the administration, promotion, growth, and innovation of 
SAILBRIT and its members was identified. SAILBRIT hosts about 120 firms, all of which 
are affiliated to the cluster governing body (Eurolarge Innovation, 2014). Sailing and the 
sailing industry is anchored in the people and the history of Brittany as a region with a 
massive coastline and very changeable weather conditions. Already a couple of decades ago 
today famous sailors started to build their own boats to cross the Atlantic and laid therewith 
the foundation for today’s shipyards and professional ocean racing stables. An important 
driver of the development of a sailing and ocean racing industry was the local government’s 
decision to invest in maritime infrastructure and to dedicate industrial space to the maritime 
industry exclusively. Brittany provides clear features of an industrial cluster around ocean 
racing comprising diverse interconnected members. Therefore this industry cluster was 
chosen for this study. 
SAILAUCK – the sailing cluster in New Zealand is located in Auckland and 
surrounding covering approximately 77 km and concentrating most CLORs close to the 
marinas next to the central business district. CLORs were not affiliated to a cluster governing 
body, however a wider scoped marine trade and export group counted 470 members including 
other marine businesses than sailing such as fishing and kayaking (NZ Marine, 2014). New 
Zealand’s people and their history are deeply intertwined with the ocean and with navigation 
14 
 
since settlers came to New Zealand by boat and since New Zealand consists of two island 
with huge coastlines of varying conditions. Sailing is today integrated in schools, in social 
events, in the daily life of people, and in the economy. Many New Zealanders either send their 
kids to sailing courses, participate in leisure or competitive sailing, watch major sailing events 
(e.g., the Volvo Ocean Race), or work in the maritime industry. 
Data Collection 
Data was collected consecutively for the two cases from March 2012 to April 2013. This time 
period was interesting for sailing as a sport and industry because the main ocean races took 
place or were in preparation during this period: the Volvo Ocean Race with stopovers in 
Auckland (New Zealand) and Lorient (France) in 2012 and the America’s Cup in San 
Francisco with Team Emirates New Zealand as a competitor in 2013. Four types of data 
sources were used for this research. Interviews and observations served as primary data 
source. Organizational and archival information served as secondary data sources (Chetty, 
2004; Yin, 2009). Table 1 provides an overview of collected data. 
------------- Insert Table 1 here. ---------- 
Interviews were primarily conducted face-to-face (86%). Two types of interviews 
were conducted, explorative informal interviews (n=9) and formal semi-structured interviews 
(n=54). Explorative interviews were conducted with cluster managers, industry experts, or 
other CLOR employees. These interviews covered personal experiences and knowledge of the 
cluster. Explorative interviews permitted the identification of important CLORs to include in 
the study. It facilitated access to interviewees through the snowball method (Miles, 
Huberman, & Saldaña, 2014).  
Formal semi-structured interviews were conducted with general executives and 
managers from marketing or research and development (R&D) departments. The average 
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interview duration was 48 minutes. Table 2 shows details concerning the interviewed 
organizations per case.  
------------- Insert Table 2 here. ---------- 
We conducted at least two formal semi-structured interviews with representatives of 
each of the ten CLOR types (Figure 2) with a few exceptions in those categories that seemed 
especially important (e.g., accessory supplier) or those that played subordinate roles (e.g., 
amateur clubs). The interviewed individuals were identified as primarily involved in 
interorganizational linkages. In the French case the selection of interviewees was largely 
guided by the cluster manager form the local cluster governing body. The cluster manager 
served as expert to identify key actors in the cluster. In the New Zealand case the interviewee 
selection was much more based on the snowball method.  
The semi-structured interview questions probed the CLORs’ involvement in 
interorganizational linkages (To what extent are you linked to other CLORs in the cluster?); 
the nature of the interorganizational linkages (How are you interconnected with these 
CLORs? Can you describe the linkages between your organization and other CLORs?); 
motivations and intentions for involvement in interorganizational linkages (Why and how 
have these linkages developed? To what extent are there regular linkages?); and the 
management and governance of interorganizational linkages (How are these 
interorganizational linkages governed? Are there any particular organizations that manage and 
lead the development of the cluster? Which ones are those and how are they doing it?). All 
interviews were transcribed by the principal investigator and interview transcripts were 
verified by participants.  
The principal investigator attended trade shows, amateur and professional sport 
events, product trials, professional seminars, and networking events to collect observational 
data that inform about interorganizational linkages and interactions amongst CLORs. Data 
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collected during observations included photographs, explorative interviews, advertisements, 
event programs, and newspaper articles. Results from observations were summarized in 
reports for further analysis. Observations also served as a starting point to contact 
interviewees. 
Secondary data including organizational information and archival data complemented 
our data set. Organizational information referred to CLOR-authored presentations, brochures, 
catalogues, websites, internet blogs, advertising material, and product descriptions. Archival 
data include third-party authored information such as specialist journals, industry reports, and 
mainstream media publications.  
Data Analysis 
Following deductive reasoning a number of themes were identified from the literature review 
to classify different types of interorganizational linkages according to the number of partners 
involved, the formalized nature of linkages, and the typically involved stakeholders. We 
aimed at discovering evolutional patterns of different interorganizational linkages and why 
one leads to the other. Motivational patterns to create or join different interorganizational 
linkages for different stakeholder groups of sport industry clusters were explored with 
Oliver’s (1990) framework for explaining motivational patterns for IOR formation. 
All interview transcripts, observations reports, and selected secondary data were 
analyzed and coded using NVivo, a qualitative data analysis software program that allowed 
the allocation of textual and visual elements to themes. The first research questions – what 
kind of interorganizational linkages exist in sport industry clusters – was addressed with a 
deductive approach. The main coding themes were IOR and ION based on previous 
definitions and concepts (Babiak, 2007; Oliver, 1990; Provan et al., 2007, Warren, 1967). Sub 
themes were informal IOR and formal IOR, and informal ION and formal ION (Babiak, 2007; 
Gerke, 2014; Vlaar et al., 2006). After deductive coding analysis we conducted frequency 
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counts of the number of times a theme occurs in data and the number and type of sources 
within each theme (Babiak & Thibault, 2009). This aimed at better organization of data and 
easier quotation retrieval. The coding process was conducted by the principal investigator. In 
order to ensure reliability and objectivity of coding results, tables of coded references were 
provided to co-authors for cross-checks and translation approval. 
To address the second research question – how do interorganizational linkages 
develop in sport industry clusters we conducted inductive analysis across all data to derive 
patterns that explain the development of the different interorganizational linkages. We 
compared those with previous research on motivational patterns for IOR/ION creation and 
discussed differences and similarities.  
Finally to address the third research question – why do interorganizational linkages in 
sport industry cluster develop – we returned to a deductive approach using Oliver’s (1990) 
framework of motivational patterns for joining or creating IORs/IONs. Our data set provides 
findings from combining inductive and deductive analysis (Babiak, 2007; Dubois & Gadde, 
2007). 
Findings 
In the following sections we provide evidence that consecutively addresses the three research 
questions: different kinds of interorganizational linkages, the development process of those, 
and motivational patterns for creating or joining interorganizational linkages. 
Typical Compositions and Nature of Interorganizational Linkages 
The data analysis shows that overall both IORs and IONs were prevalent amongst CLORs in 
the investigated clusters. Bilateral relationships tended to be formalized while multilateral 
networks tended to remain on informal terms. Following the approach of Babiak and Thibault 
(2009) Table 3 provides an overview of the number of times a theme appears in data and the 
number and type of sources within each theme for the case study SAILBRIT.  
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------------- Insert Table 3 here. ---------- 
Table 4 provides an overview of the number of times a theme appears in data and the 
number and type of sources within each theme for the case study SAILAUCK. Evidence for 
the different types of linkages is discussed in the following paragraphs. 
------------- Insert Table 4 here. ---------- 
Formal IORs between CLORs were manifested in different types of formal 
agreements. There were commercial IORs between buyer and supplier, between service 
provider and client, and between subcontractor and client. Formal IORs based on commercial 
interests were one-off orders, mid-to long-term purchasing contracts, cost estimates, invoices, 
and delivery orders. An accessory supplier from SAILBRIT explained: “There are contracts. 
Sometimes we are held to push formalization quite far, like a partnership, but most of the 
times it is just a cost estimate, a delivery order, or an invoice.” Accessory suppliers in 
SAILAUCK emphasized formal contractual relationships with clients who could be 
professional teams, naval architects, or private owners. Competing core equipment 
manufacturers might have even joined forces formally to secure bigger contracts. These 
findings confirm the traditional view of IORs as being rooted in market mechanisms 
(Håkansson, 2006). However, in the next paragraph evidence shows that formal IORs were 
developed for more than pure commercial linkage reasons. 
Other formal types of IORs were agreements and partnerships aiming at innovation 
and R&D. This type of linkage has been investigated in previous research but authors do not 
explicitly distinguish IORs and IONs (Capo-Vicedo et al., 2008; Gadde et al., 2003). In our 
sport industry clusters IORs developed often between a cluster company and a university 
laboratory or research institute but also between a supplier and a professional or amateur sport 
entity. These IORs were formalized through simple commissioning of a study, through joint 
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funding of a doctoral student, via specification sheets1, and through confidentiality 
agreements (e.g., for joint product development). A professional sport team from SAILBRIT 
stated that “For five years the partnership has been quite structured. That means that every 
year we make a specification sheet for them with our needs.” Professional and amateur sport 
entities kept IORs to core equipment manufacturers, marine accessories, services, and systems 
suppliers through sponsoring agreements and for product testing purposes, “We make quite 
formal criteria to formalize their needs and their feedback.” (Service/consulting firm, 
SAILBRIT) 
Governing bodies such as the chamber of commerce, public authorities for economic 
development, industry associations, sport federations, or dedicated cluster governing bodies 
played a key role in forming those formal IORs. The central role of dedicated sector 
associations has been highlighted before in the maritime sector (Viederyte, 2013). In sport 
industry clusters governing bodies had formal IORs with diverse cluster companies through 
funding programs or membership. Professional and amateur sport entities had formalized 
IORs with national and regional sport governing bodies through membership. There were few 
IORs between amateur and professional sport entities.  
Even though the IORs in SAILBRIT tended to be formalized an accessory supplier 
stated: “I think that the contract is only a paper. It has only little value, even if we arrived at a 
conflict concerning an aspect in the contract, I don’t think that would play such an important 
role.” Also interviewees from SAILAUCK questioned the formalization of IORs in supplier 
contracts. A core equipment manufacturer explained the role of formal contracts with engine 
suppliers:  
                                                 
1 Specification sheet refers to a detailed description of the design and materials used to make something (Oxford 
Dictionnaries, 2015).  
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Some of the electronics are formalized on a contract but for a matter of words. It’s really 
just a document to get us the buying power and the price because if someone [a customer] 
comes in and wants not a [name of brand A], they want a [name of brand B] we would sell 
it to them.” and “We have done contracts and it never really changes the outcome. 
These results highlight the buying power of customers. These findings also contradict 
previous arguments that formalization of interorganizational linkages is necessary to reduce 
problems of understanding (Vlaar et al., 2006). We explain this through the fact that 
interlinked organizations in the sailing industry clusters have similar structures (SME), culture 
(e.g., sport and nature oriented), management styles (e.g., flat hierarchy, participative 
management), and backgrounds (e.g., local origin, affection to sailing). 
Informal IORs arise from formal IORs through regular exchange and interaction that 
create affinities and interpersonal relationships. A marine service firm in SAILBRIT testified 
“We discuss equally outside of purely commercial relationships”. Informal exchange is 
possible through geographical proximity, higher frequency of meetings, and lower barriers to 
meet. CLORs “Easily discuss with people and [are] able to look for competencies not too far 
away.” (Service/consulting firm, SAILBRIT) Informal IORs arise from family ties, 
friendships, and other interpersonal linkages that have typically existed before market 
mechanisms related to the growing marine business led to formal IORs. A professional sailing 
team in SAILBRIT reflected on this aspect, “With the suppliers […] we function indeed like a 
family in the racing stable, and in fact the doors are always open for these people [suppliers], 
they walk in and out as they like, and they mark our lives.” These findings are in line with 
Chetty and Agndal’s (2008) proposition that informal IORs are created through interpersonal 
interactions. Informal IORs might occur in parallel to formal IORs and might be maintained 
once the latter ceases. Word-of-mouth communication is promoted through informal IORs 
and provides not only feedback but often new business. An education/research institute from 
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SAILAUCK said about a systems supplier with whom they collaborate for R&D: “So they 
will help us when we ask and we always get [them] to make our sails [for tests]”.  
Informal ION. There is strong evidence for informal IONs in both cases. Already 
previous research investigated IONs in industry clusters (Connell & Voola, 2013; Gomes & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013; Li et al., 2013). Adding on to Gomes and Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen’s (2013) findings about the macro structures of clusters, our results reveal the 
importance of historical and socio-economic circumstances for sport industry cluster 
development. Informal IORs support formal IORs as a core equipment manufacturer in 
SAILAUCK explained:  
It happens so much smoother when you have a good working relationship. This does not 
necessarily mean regularly meeting up and going out for lunch or dinner, it is frequent 
communication and the odd catch-up meeting around a table to discuss any issues or 
sharing of good ideas and then getting back to work.  
A service/consulting firm from SAILBRIT confirmed, “Our relationships with people 
in the cluster are prior to creation of the cluster. We have been here in the region for a long 
time though and we knew all the companies that have been integrated in the cluster.” These 
quotations support Chetty and Agndal’s (2008) proposition that interpersonal networks turn 
into interorganizational networks within industry clusters.  
Two typical constellations of informal IONs in sport industry clusters can be 
distinguished: informal IONs consisting of similar organizations and informal IONs 
consisting of different but complementary organizations. Informal IONs between similar 
CLORs are formed through informal support and altruism by providing expertise and 
information to other firms. This was expressed by a service/consulting firm in SAILBRIT “I 
see that more like an exchange between these people and like primordial source of 
information because otherwise I would never have had access to this information.” Similar 
CLORs might share the same market and therefore exchange about difficult clients. Informal 
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IONs amongst complementary organizations were formed through interactions between 
different CLORs that were originally linked through market mechanisms. Their interactions 
exceeded formal agreements through interpersonal trust, mutual respect, citizenship, hand-
shake agreements, long-standing knowledge of each other, and long-lasting IORs (Chetty & 
Agndal, 2008).  
Informal IONs are formed in order to find solutions for shared problems and to share 
cost for investments. This happens with varying involvement of governing bodies. CLORs in 
SAILAUCK formed an informal ION to defend their interests in access to waterfront based 
industrial land towards the city council. A marine service firm in SAILBRIT took initiative to 
create a shared online communication and information platform for marine services and 
equipment suppliers and customers. Other firms shared the cost for a boat hull maintenance 
and cleaning facility. The starting point for these informal cooperative or collaborative 
projects is often the cluster governing bodies. This body creates formal opportunities for 
informal interorganizational encounters and exchange: “Similarly the fact that especially the 
firms know each other and that there is regularly room where they can meet in an informal 
way around some animation, interprofessional encounters, etc.”(Education/research institute 
in SAILBRIT)  
Informal IONs are created in the context of ocean racing teams that are in preparation 
for important competitions. Professional sport teams need not only physical preparation and 
training but they also need to build the race boat in close cooperation and collaboration with 
core equipment manufacturers (shipyards), naval architects, systems suppliers (sail makers 
and riggers), accessory suppliers (marine equipment), and service/consulting firms. A system 
supplier from SAILAUCK explained, “It is very, very important to actually engage the 
suppliers and make them part of the whole process.” The involvement of numerous 
differently specialized CLORs that usually work physically close together in the shipyard or 
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on the testing grounds is a strong lever for the creation of informal IONs. This aspect is 
unique to sport industry clusters as the linking element are professional sport teams which are 
not present in other industrial clusters. Social bonds such as family ties or friendships foster 
the creation of those informal IONs between firms. A governing body from SAILAUCK 
confirmed that “You find that a lot of people know each other at a personal level”. These 
informal IONs provided access to external competences, capabilities, and knowledge without 
entering in commercial relationships as evident in SAILBRIT: “Just when we need 
competencies of friends, that’s what it is for, it is about working your network and make the 
networking functioning.”(Accessory supplier) and “I think that it is very interesting for the 
smaller firms to be able to join us when we work and research because we have a technical 
development that the others do not have.” (Systems supplier)  
Continuous collaboration aiming at a common goal – constructing a fast and safe 
ocean racing boat – creates a temporary special atmosphere and environment characterized by 
a concentration of diverse and in-depth expertise around sailing. This was described by a 
system supplier in SAILAUCK as “A big library. […] It’s just a continuous cycle of building 
of knowledge. It’s quite a unique sort of environment.” Informal interorganizational exchange 
creates IONs amongst the different actors in a boat-building project. This is indispensable to 
find solutions for problems that sit at the intersection of different boat elements (e.g., sail and 
mast) or to harmonize the functioning of those different elements. Staff rotation amongst 
CLORs of all types facilitates informal networking building and knowledge diffusion in sport 
industry clusters. Spatial proximity of organizations based in the cluster permits informal 
face-to-face meetings and the development of cooperation and collaboration in early stages 
without the necessity to formalize linkages (Gadde et al., 2003). A governing body in 
SAILAUCK explained:  
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Fifty percent of the gain is actually the informal connections that they make with other 
companies. So, it’s a huge value, meeting companies that otherwise they wouldn’t or in an 
environment that is conducive for them to talk about their problems or opportunities with 
competitors or maybe complementary companies. 
A unique characteristic of informal IONs in the studied sailing clusters is the trickle-
down effect of knowledge, information, skill, and technology between professional and 
amateur sport entities. A systems supplier from SAILAUCK explained: “I never really saw or 
saw very little that the other boats were using things that they would have got from the 
America’s Cup or the Around-the-world-race. I didn’t see other boats doing that, other than 
us.” The physical closeness between amateur sport, professional sport, and the specialized 
systems, accessory, and services suppliers permits this knowledge transfer amongst different 
CLORs at minimal transaction cost. This process was facilitated through cross-functional 
roles of key persons in marine companies, professional or amateur sport entities, and 
governing bodies. These interlinkages created informal IONs between profit and non-profit 
organizations in the sport industry cluster. Those were maintained through interpersonal 
relationships that had emerged over time, even when these cross-functional assignments had 
come to an end. 
Formal IONs in the investigated sailing clusters were membership based cluster 
governing bodies that pursue shared objectives of their adherents. There was a cluster 
governing body for ocean racing technology in SAILBRIT which was a formalized ION of 
around 120 firms and related institutions with an interest in sailing, particularly ocean racing.  
The differences and similarities. SAILBRIT and SAILAUCK provided similar 
evidence for the strong prevalence of informal IONs and formal IORs, and weaker evidence 
for informal IORs. The main difference was the prevalence of formal IONs in SAILBRIT 
while those seemed to be absent in SAILAUCK. However, there was a marine industry 
association which had a much larger scope.  
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The attitudes towards governing bodies were different across the cases. Many of the 
interviewees in SAILAUCK exposed a consuming attitude towards the marine association. 
They considered the membership as indispensable in order to be part of the industry network 
and to receive important information. In contrast, the CLORs in SAILBRIT had a 
participative attitude towards the cluster governing body and showed intentions and initiatives 
to develop this formalized ION further.  
The important role of the cluster governing body for collaborative innovation projects 
has been highlighted in SAILBRIT: “When we work with others that allows us to be open-
minded, to understand how the others function, and to work and discover together with the 
cluster new technologies.” (Systems supplier). In contrast to SAILBRIT, SAILAUCK seems 
to function as a self-governed system. This is due to cultural differences and a different 
perception of the role of the state in the economy of a state. Similar results have been found in 
other French cluster studies in which the companies are pertinent to demand and accept state 
intervention to foster institutionalized cluster structures and local industry development 
(Berthinier-Poncet, 2013; Bocquet, Brion, & Mothe, 2013). Another cultural difference is the 
employment of a bottom-up approach in the development of a cluster governing body in 
SAILBRIT compared to a top-down approach in SAILAUCK (Viederyte, 2013).  
Further differences were evident in terms of the types of CLORs that are mostly 
involved in or impacted by interorganizational linkages. In SAILBRIT accessory suppliers 
and service/consulting firms were mostly involved in formal IORs. A systems supplier from 
SAILBRIT explained “We have commercial relationships with cluster companies; one 
example is [name of company] who manufactures amongst other things marine paint”. In 
SAILAUCK it was the core equipment manufacturers and systems suppliers that emphasized 
formal IORs, “We've got very strong alliances with Yamaha Motors and with our sailing 
contracts with Volvo Ocean Race, America's Cup, Farr 40 Race, for those sorts of contracts 
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we use Yamaha outboards for those.” (Shipyard). IORs in both cases were formalized 
through commercial procedures and contracts (Vlaar et al., 2006). 
Development of Interorganizational Linkages 
Chetty and Agndal (2008) refer to IONs as the accumulation of IORs that emerge and expand 
between organizations through interaction. As soon as one organization is involved in several 
IORs, one can argue that a network emerges. However, what is intriguing in our results is that 
CLORs perceived IORs as rather formalized while IONs were rather informal. Therefore the 
accumulation of formal IORs seems to result in the creation of informal IONs. However, there 
is also evidence that IORs became informal after a while, even though they were initially 
purely formal commercial exchanges. A governing body from SAILAUCK explained, “I 
would probably say a lot of the business in the marine industry doesn’t have contracts 
anyway. So things are quite informal for better or worse in a lot of cases.”  
The CLORs’ perception of the formalized nature of interorganizational linkages and 
the reality was not always congruent, i.e., the purchasing act of parts might be considered as 
informal because no contract is signed. With regards to the definition of formal links as those 
that have a legal or formal status and hence a definite structure or shape (Vlaar et al., 2006), it 
is indeed debatable whether a purchasing act that is based on a handshake agreement and no 
unit numbers or prices are fixed in writing should be considered as formal or informal 
linkage. It is an interaction that is rooted in market mechanisms but other factors such as the 
interpersonal relationships between the persons representing each firm might influence the 
nature of the IOR. 
Informal IORs between complementary firms develop from IORs rooted in market 
mechanism. CLORs that have had business IORs or other formal IORs over a longer period of 
time started to get to know each other very well. This resulted in the creation of informal 
IORs as the director of this core equipment manufacturer in SAILAUCK explained:  
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I was a Chairman in the Olympic Committee, that was a very formal role but there are also 
a lot of informal roles where people in those organizations will ring us up for advice. I am 
not anymore in any of those roles but we still communicate a lot with them, but that has 
nothing to do with [company name]. 
This quotation shows how formal IORs can develop into informal IORs that then add up to an 
informal ION.  
In the case of SAILBRIT an informal ION developed into a formal ION, the cluster 
governing body. This institution provided a new platform for the development of formal 
IORs. The cluster governing body was a platform and intermediary to link potential buyers 
and suppliers in the cluster. At the same time CLORs could made informal contacts during 
events and via the network of the cluster governing body. From this point the cycle restarts. 
Figure 3 illustrates this development cycle of different interorganizational linkages 
(i=informal, f=formal). This is only an indicative illustration and is not exclusive towards 
other forms of linkage development. 
------------- Insert Figure 3 here. ---------- 
Figure 3. Development process of interorganizational linkages 
Motivational Patterns for Interorganizational Linkages 
We identify reasons and motives for CLORs to join or create IORs or IONs and discuss the 
identified reasons and motives with regards to six contingencies for IOR development. This 
discussion allows us to transfer motivational patterns suggested by Oliver (1990) in the 
context of sport industry clusters. The results are illustrated in Table 5 and explained in the 
paragraphs below. 
------------- Insert Table 5 here. ---------- 
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The institutionalization of a cluster through a membership-based governing body 
reflects asymmetric motives. Cluster governing bodies were formal IONs that collected 
resources from members (e.g., membership fees) and used them for collective projects (e.g., 
for R&D projects). These collective projects might not have been in the interest or the priority 
of all CLORs but just a few. An alternative to collective projects was collaborative projects. 
These define objectives and collect funds specifically from those CLORs that were interested 
in these objectives. However, collaborative projects within a cluster governing body created 
exclusivity and disparity amongst CLORs as results were only available for those CLORs that 
financed the project.  
Asymmetric reasons for formal IORs in clusters might be related to organization size, 
control over the rules governing the interorganizational exchange, the possibilities to continue 
without the partner, the effectiveness of coercive strategies, and the concentration of inputs 
(Oliver, 1990). Heterogeneity of CLORs (e.g., size) appeared to be an asymmetric motive for 
IORs in the sport industry clusters. The cluster governing body in SAILBRIT provided access 
to technology and facilities of other CLORs. A systems supplier from SAILBRIT explained:  
I think that it is very interesting for the small companies to be able to join us in our work 
because we have capacities in terms of calculations, technical development, and 
technology that others do not have. So in associating themselves with us they have the 
possibility to develop themselves as well. 
However, the CLORs that provided resources to the cluster governing body risked to 
lose control of the shared resources. Small CLORs tended to provide intangible resources 
(e.g., ideas), while bigger firms might have shares tangible resources (e.g., research facilities). 
The bigger firms might gained power over the smaller ones but it was unlikely that the 
smaller one would gain power over the bigger company. 
Our study demonstrated that reciprocal motives for IOR/ION formation aimed at 
collaborative advantage and included for example collaborations for R&D, for product 
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testing, through sponsoring, informal information and knowledge transfer, and collective 
promotion at trade shows or sport events. A core equipment manufacturer in SAILAUCK 
referred to an IOR with an external naval architect who developed designs for them, “He 
would never go and sell it to anyone else because that is just understood but it's never 
discussed. We have never had contracts or anything.” 
Necessity was reflected in the ION that was formed with the creation of the cluster 
governing body in SAILBRIT. There were three different public authorities that jointly 
funded the cluster governing body for the local ocean racing industry. The cluster governing 
body had necessarily close formal IORs to these governing bodies and depended on them for 
future funding. However, CLORs that joined the cluster governing body were another source 
of funding. Public authorities would offer certain funding possibilities only to consortia or 
partnerships of CLORs and hence encourage formation of linkages. Necessity was evident as 
motive for commercial IOR because certain CLORs depend on clients or suppliers to continue 
their activity. For example, core equipment manufacturers in SAILBRIT entered formal IORs 
to respond to a larger order of boat hulls that otherwise neither of them could have fulfilled 
alone.  
Efficiency was evident in our findings particularly related to boat-building projects. 
Due to the close cooperation of different firms on the boat construction site, knowledge and 
information exchanges were more efficient; better solutions at the intersections of different 
parts (e.g., sail and mast) were found more efficiently; and collaboration synergies were 
optimized through direct face-to-face meetings and communication. Firms that were involved 
in boat-building projects, work closely together over a longer period of time which increased 
efficiency through better mutual understanding of each other’s challenges and needs. A core 
equipment manufacturer from SAILAUCK reflected on this cooperative mode of functioning:  
30 
 
“I think part of the reason why ETNZ (Emirates Team New Zealand) has been a successful 
team over the years to some degrees is because we are one of the first to realize that you 
should not just treat all the components that go onto the boat as separate entities. They all 
affect each other.” 
CLORs looked for legitimacy when they joined the cluster governing body and 
participate in collective actions (e.g., better reputation through collective participation in trade 
shows). External pressures for firms pushing them to join the cluster governing body were 
primarily economic but might also have been social. Firms in SAILBRIT joined the cluster 
governing body in order to be associated more obviously with ocean racing as sport and 
industry. This provided them with an attractive image and could serve as show case to attract 
new clients, even from other sectors than the ocean racing sector. The motive of legitimacy 
was less evident in SAILAUCK as there was no dedicated cluster governing body for the 
ocean racing industry. 
Informal IORs were the most prominent interorganizational linkages that were chosen 
with the motive of stability. Informal IORs tended to be based on trust and reliance between 
CLORs that had established a long-term relationship. Informal IORs served as source of 
expertise, market information, new knowledge, and anticipated changes. Informal IORs 
assured access to this information which might be crucial to survival to the mostly small- and 
medium-sized CLORs in sport industry clusters.  
Discussion 
The findings from this study reflect the complexity and varied nature of interorganizational 
linkages in sport industry clusters. The interorganizational field of sport industry clusters 
consist of IORs that are embedded in a highly complex and heterogeneous organizational 
environment. As soon as CLORs that are involved in an IOR interact with the environment, 
new IORs are formed which results in an ION (Warren, 1967). The empirical context in our 
case studies is ocean racing and all organizations that have an interest in this sport as profit or 
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non-profit organizations. The evidence underlining the main findings are discussed for each 
research question in the following paragraphs. 
Mainly Involved Organizations in Interorganizational Linkages 
The majority of CLORs are comprised of private companies that have commercial IORs with 
customers or suppliers. This explains the predominance of formalized IORs in both clusters 
(Gadde et al., 2003). The clusters comprise not only industry partners but also government 
agencies and universities/research institutes (Etzkowitz, 2014, Shah & Pahnke, 2014). These 
CLORs form both formal and informal IONs. Cluster governing bodies represent formal IONs 
while informal ION developed around boat-building projects involving various CLORs. The 
crucial role of public authorities as facilitator of formal IONs and the role of 
education/research institutes as stimulator of innovation through formal IORs is confirmed in 
the context of sport industry clusters.  
In sport industry clusters private firms depend not only on other firms but also on 
professional and amateur sport entities. Systems and accessory suppliers, service providers, 
media, and designers tend to have either informal or both informal and formal IORs to 
primarily professional sport teams and training centers but also occasionally to amateur sport 
clubs. These IORs are built through regular social interaction and exchanges which create 
affinities and interpersonal relationships. Establishing a congruent understanding of each 
other’s identity in relation to others – congruent sense making – and psychological contracts 
amongst the involved parties contributes to the establishment of cooperative IORs (Ring and 
Van De Ven, 1994). However, these are not necessarily formalized as personal relationships 
and informal psychological contracts substitute or at least complement formal IORs. 
Conditional factors are the development and augmentation of trust and reliance over time. 
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Typical Level of Formalization of Interorganizational Linkages 
IORs tend to be formalized while IONs tend to remain informal in nature. This is due to the 
limited duration of ocean racing competitions and the competing teams. An ocean racing 
event usually takes several years of preparation. Teams prepare sailors and the boat 
construction over two to three years. There is a number of different commercial and 
contractual IORs between the firms contributing to the project. In addition to the formal boat-
building project, there is a parallel underlying layer of an informal ION through family bonds, 
friendships, informal exchanges, and joint practices of sailing. These formal links and the 
informal ION mutually influence and reinforce each other. The findings show that formal 
IORs can be the starting point to develop informal IONs through frequent direct contact and 
exchanges. On the other hand informal ION can lead to repeat formal IOR for future boat-
building projects (Capo-Vicedo et al., 2008; Gomes & Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013).  
Interpersonal networks transform into IONs in sport industry clusters (Chetty & 
Agndal, 2008). Informal IONs based on personal relationships turn into formal IONs as 
evident in SAILBRIT through the creation of a formal cluster governing body. This example 
emphasizes the role of public authorities as intermediary, facilitator, and lever of potential for 
IONs. CLORs tend to be rather homogenous in terms of backgrounds, beliefs, structure, 
culture, cognitive frames, management styles, and philosophies due to the co-location in the 
same geographical area, historical and socio-cultural anchorage, and the interest in sailing. 
Therefore, IONs in sport industry clusters do not require formalization to reduce problems of 
understanding. However formalization of IONs seems to be fruitful in order to create 
awareness about potential for synergies, efficiencies, and innovation through 
interorganizational collaboration in the cluster (Vlaar et al., 2006).  
Sport industry clusters are characterized by an evolutional process of formal and 
informal IORs and IONs. While IORs tend to be formal in the beginning, there is a recurrent 
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pattern of formal IORs that turn into informal IORs once the formal agreement ceases. 
However, informal IORs develop also from social ties like family bonds, friendships, and 
from practicing sports. The accumulation of informal IORs in a geographically close area 
allowed cluster members to meet informally and spontaneously permitted the creation of an 
informal ION amongst CLORs. Informal ION can be facilitator and source of economic 
activity and potential for growth. In recognition of this, different public authorities provided 
funds to create a cluster governing body – a formal ION in one of our cases. The cluster 
governing body consisted of private, public, and non-profit members that had a shared interest 
in the advancement of economic activities around ocean racing.  
Main Motivational Patterns for Creating or Joining Interorganizational Linkages 
The most evident motive for joining or creating IORs or IONs – formal and informal – was 
reciprocity out of the six determinants for IOR development suggested by Oliver (1990). 
Reciprocity refers to the pursuit of coordination, cooperation, and collaboration in IORs 
(Oliver, 1990). Cooperation is also a behavior that is often attributed to clusters and CLORs 
according to cluster theory (Porter, 2008). Reciprocity as motive was evident in IORs and 
IONs formed for research collaborations, in joint bids for funding or tenders, in reciprocal 
informal exchange of knowledge and information, in joint presentations at trade shows or web 
sites, and in joint approaches to problem solutions during boat building projects. The types 
and level of reciprocity were quite diverse in our data and hence, further research in exploring 
reciprocal motives for IORs and IONs is suggested in the context of sport industry clusters. 
Traditional cluster theory argues that CLORs are interlinked through commonalities 
and complementarities which lead to simultaneous competition and cooperation (Porter, 
2008). The motive asymmetry for IOR development reflects competitive behavior because 
organizations consider their environment as hostile and hence try to dominate their partners 
via an IOR or ION. Asymmetry was only evident as a motive for formal ION development as 
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cluster members sought to be able to exercise power over other CLORs in collective projects 
or through taking propriety of shared resources.  
These results are interesting in the light of Babiak’s (2007) results concerning motives 
for organizations to join cross-sectoral IORs. The motives of corporate partners to engage in 
IORs with non-profit national sport organizations were explored. Similar results were 
obtained in terms of reciprocity. However, Babiak (2007) emphasized that corporate 
managers’ personal interests, values, or beliefs lead to motives for developing IOR with non-
profit sport organizations. While Babiak (2007) concentrated on IORs this study also 
investigated IONs. An ION consists of indirect IORs which can lead to anonymity and a loss 
of control over any resources that are shared with the ION. Gadde et al. (2003, p. 359) 
summarized this effect of IORs as follows “The relationship combines the physical and 
organizational resources of a company with those of its counterparts. Therefore, a significant 
part of a company’s total resource base is located beyond its ownership boundary and is 
controlled bilaterally with other firms.” Our findings confirm that this effect of loss of control 
is prominent in IONs.  
In both cases the necessity motive for IONs was the dependence of and organization 
on is funding partners (Babiak, 2007). Legitimacy as motive for cluster members to join IORs 
or IONs was more comparable to motives of trade associations, e.g., enhance CLORs’ and 
cluster’s image collectively; or voluntary agency federations, e. g., increase cluster visibility 
towards public authorities (Oliver, 1990). The affiliation of CLORs to a cluster governing was 
attractive because it helps to improve CLORs’ image and their marketing communications.  
The stability motive is associated with informal IONs. Social integration in the 
industry and the psychological support from other firms in the same industry sector with 
similar belief, objectives, and problems provide members with perceived and some real 
security. Finally efficiency motives were evident in informal IONs of boat-building projects. 
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The close and direct cooperation on a shared physical site – the boat yard – provides easier 
and more efficient means of meetings and exchange. This results in more efficient problem-
solving and the harmonization of interrelated processes.  
Conclusions 
Two people shake hands, three sign a paper. While IOR tend to be formalized, ION tend to 
remain on informal terms. This article provides a nuanced perspective on the variety of 
interorganizational linkages in the cross-sectoral context of sport industry clusters. So far 
literature has focused on either IORs (Babiak, 2007; Babiak & Thibault, 2009; Cousens et al., 
2006; Dana & Granata, 2013; Mendez & Mercier, 2006; Oliver, 1990; Ring & Van De Ven, 
1994; Vlaar et al., 2006), on ION (Camagni, 1993; Capo-Vicedo et al., 2008; Chetty & 
Agndal, 2008; Provan et al., 2007), or on both IOR and ION but often using the terms 
interchangeably (Gadde et al., 2003; Håkansson, 2006). This article suggest a clearer 
distinction and consequently a clearer terminology of interorganizational linkages and its 
nuanced differences. 
Relationships are like networks, a never ending story. Formal IOR tend to develop into 
informal IOR. Over time an informal ION emerges. The synergy potential of the informal 
ION incites the institutionalization of the ION into a formal governing body to better take 
advantage of the ION. The development process of interorganizational linkages and 
consequently determinants that favor the development of interorganizational linkages have 
been studied from various perspectives. IOR development can be based on interpersonal 
relationships (Chetty & Agndal, 2008); six motivational patterns including reciprocity and 
asymmetry as motives for IOR development (Oliver, 1990); and key factors for IOR 
development and longevity including congruent sensemaking (Ring & Van De Ven, 1994). 
This article complements previous research on cross-sectoral IORs (Babiak, 2007; Babiak & 
Thibault, 2009) by focusing on a cross-sectoral empirical context dominated by private small- 
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and medium-sized organizations – sport industry clusters. We propose a circular framework 
that highlights the perpetuity and renaissance of IOR and ION development. 
Tit for tat. Results show that reciprocity is the main motive for joining or developing 
interorganizational linkages. In studying motives of sport equipment firms and related 
organizations (e.g., public authorities, universities) this study provides insight of motives for 
organizations joining an IOR or IOL in a highly competitive environment.  
The findings of this research provide practical insight for managers of 
interorganizational linkages in cross-sectoral contexts (e.g., sport industry clusters). 
Traditional corporate strategy approaches argue for differentiation or cost leadership 
strategies (Ansoff, 1987). Insights about IORs and IONs reveal alternatives to purely 
competitive approaches to strategic management of profit and non-profit organizations. This 
article advances knowledge and evidence for practitioners about possibilities and motives to 
enter interorganizational linkages. Coordination, cooperation, or even collaboration are 
alternative strategies in order to engage with and manage an organization’s interactions with 
the external environment. This article provides recommendations for managers operating in 
sport industry clusters and shows how interaction and development of interorganizational 
linkages with non-profit organizations, tertiary institutions, and sport entities can benefit 
companies and vice versa.  
Engagement in informal IORs can open up research collaborations, sponsoring 
opportunities, and provide access to larger contracts or external funding through collective 
bids. Involvement in informal IORs can provide stability through permanent access to crucial 
information and knowledge that organizations could not access alone or only with difficulties 
via formal ways. Formal IONs provide access to other CLORs’ resources which allows the 
new combination of a variety of resources leading to innovative solutions (Schumpeter, 
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1942). Formal IONs permit CLORs to promote each other collectively and reduce costs 
through joint investment, economies of scale, or augmented purchasing power. 
The findings from this research are limited in their generalization to other contexts 
because it was conducted in only one type of industry. However, Yin (2009) argues that literal 
replication of findings across similar case settings strengthens theory. While there are some 
differences across the two cases – due to cultural differences – most of the results were 
congruent across the two cases. The findings show that sailing industries are similar across 
national and cultural borders because the sport determines to some extent beliefs, values, 
management styles, modes of functioning, and philosophies of organizations and their 
managers and employees.  
This study might have suffered from the multitude of definitions that are available for 
the key terms of this research (e.g., IOR). However, it is the purpose of this study to clarify 
and provide more nuance and context to the terminology of IOR and ION in 
interorganizational research. Furthermore motivational patterns in sport industry clusters 
could have been exploited further by studying more profoundly the motives of certain types of 
CLORs (e.g., core equipment manufacturer) and compare those (Babiak, 2007).  
Further research is recommended in three areas. First this research reveals the 
limitations and interchangeability of currently used definitions in interorganizational research 
(IOR/ION). Therefore we encourage future research to advance the conceptualization of these 
key terms in interorganizational research. Second, we encourage the investigation of the 
development pattern of interorganizational linkages in different cultural and industrial 
contexts. Since our findings are only indicative and limited to one sector it would be 
interesting to see the evolutional processes of IORs and IONs in various contexts and 
compare them. Finally there is still a lot of unanswered questions in terms of motivational 
patterns for joining and creating IORs and IONs. A more nuanced study focusing on the 
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underlying factors of the different motivational patterns would allow a deeper understanding 
of the development process of interorganizational linkages and indicate ways to facilitate this 
process.  
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Figure 1. Research framework 
 
 
Figure 2. Types of organization in sport industry clusters (adapted from Gerke et al., 
2015) 
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Figure 3. Development process of interorganizational linkages 
Tables 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Overview of collected data
SAILBRIT SAILAUCK Total
Explorative informal interviews 7 2 9
Formal semi-structured Interviews 27 27 54
Direct observations 8 4 12
Organisational information* 15 12 27
Archival data* 8 1 9
* number of retained documents after scanning
Table 2: Number of interviewes per organization type
SAILBRIT SAILAUCK Total
Core equipment manufacturers 2 4 6
Architects/designers 2 2 4
Systems suppliers 4 3 7
Accessory suppliers 7 3 10
Services/cosulting fims 5 4 9
Media/commnication firms 3 1 4
Professional sport entities 2 3 5
Amateur sport entities 1 2 3
Research/education institutes 2 1 3
Governing bodies 6 3 9
Total 34 26 60
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Table 3: Findings from case study SAILBRIT
Type of source
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
O
b
se
rv
.
O
rg
. 
In
fo
.
A
rc
h
iv
. 
D
a
ta
Formal relationships 115 29 27 0 0 2
Informal relationships 59 24 22 0 1 1
Formal networks 59 22 19 1 1 1
Informal networks 134 38 28 4 4 2
Number 
sources 
within each 
theme
Number of 
times a 
theme 
appears in 
data
Table 4: Findings from case tudy SAILAUCK
Type of source
In
te
rv
ie
w
s
O
b
se
rv
.
O
rg
. 
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fo
.
A
rc
h
iv
. 
D
a
ta
Formal relationships 105 28 24 0 3 1
Informal relationships 68 26 24 0 1 1
Formal networks 26 18 15 3 0 0
Informal networks 133 34 26 1 6 1
Number 
sources 
within each 
theme
Number of 
times a 
theme 
appears in 
data
Table 5: Motives/reasons for Interorganisational Linkages
Type of Linkage Motives/Reasons Emerging from Data Motives according to Oliver (1990)
formal IOR commercial agreements and transcations 
(purchase and subcontracting), research 
collaborations, sponsoring contracts, 
confidentiality agreements, joint bids fo funding 
or a tender
reciprocity, necessity
informal IOR historically developed social ties, family bonds, 
friendships, informal knowledge and 
information transfer/exchange, possibility to 
offer joint product packages, acess to expertise
reciprocity, stability
formal ION cluster governing body/association, research 
consortium, joint bids for tenders/funding, joint 
stands and presentation at trade shows, reduce 
cost for investment 
asymmetry, reciprocity, necessity, 
legitimacy
informal ION boat-building projects, networking meetings, 
shared clients/markets, shared problems
reciprocity, efficiency
IOR=interorganizational relationshp, ION=interorganizational network
